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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
RICHARD DOLAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

12907

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Richard Dolan appeals from a decision in the Second
Judicial District Court denying his motion to dismiss and
his conviction for issuing checks against insufficient funds.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried and convicted of issuing
checks against insufficient funds. Appellant's trial and
motion to dismiss were conducted before the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist in the Second Judicial District Court.
Sentence was imposed for a term of not more than five
years and appellant is now in the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the lower
court affinned.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Between July 22 and August 16, 1971, appellant wrote
seven checks, drawn on his checking account at Walker
Bank, Ogden, Utah, and payable to three Ogden busi.
nesses. These seven checks were returned to the payee
for lack of sufficient funds. Appellant was charged with
three counts of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11
(1953). The date, amount and payee of the checks are
as follows:
July 22, 1971
August 3, 1971

August
August
August
August

11,
14,
15,
15,

1971
1971
1971
1971

August 16, 1971

$100.00
75.00

K-l\1art
K-Mart

93.64
106.15
93.95
97.52

Gibsons
Gibsons
Gibsons
Gibsons

72.63

Lafayette
Electronics

( Prosecuted as one
) felony charge

l

I

f

Prosecuted as one
felony charge

} A ppella"t pred
guilty to misde·
meanor charge

Based upon the checks issued to K-Mart, on August
24, 1971, appellant was charged with a felony pursuant
to Utah Code. Ann. § 76-20-11 (2) (b) (1953). Pursuant
to the same section of the Utah Code, on August 25, 1971,
appellant was charged with another felony based upon
the checks issued to Gibsons. Based upon the check
issued to Lafayette Electronics, on September 10, 1971,
appellant was charged with a misdemeanor pursuant w

3
Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (2) (a) (1953). The prosecutor

approved the misdemeanor complaint before he knew of
the felony possibilities (R. 42).
On September 14, 1971, preliminary hearings for the
felony charges were held before Judge Charles N. Sneddon
in the City Court of Ogden. Appellant was represented
by appointed counsel and was ordered held to stand trial
upon the offenses charged (R. 4). Later on September
14, 1971, appellant was called before the same court on
the misdemeanor charge. This proceeding was continued
until September 17, 1971, at which time appellant entered
a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge and was sentenced to ninety days in jail (R. 219).
The two felony charges were joined into one felony
charge with two counts pursuant to a memorandum Decision of the District Court (R. 42). Appellant was subjected to only one trial and was convicted on April 11,
1972, on both counts of the felony charge. Appellant was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years (R. 86).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT HAS NOT BEEN SUBJECTED
TO MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT OR DOUBLE
JEOPARDY SINCE UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-20-11(2) (1953) CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS DEFINING ALL BAD CHECKS
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ISSUED BY APPELLANT WITHIN A SIX
MONTH PERIOD AS A SINGLE "SERIES
OF CHECKS."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (1) (1953) makes it illegal
to issue checks against insufficient funds. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-20-11 (2) prescribes the punishment for subsec.
tion (1) of the statute. This section reads as follows:
"(2) Penalties for violating any provision ol
subsection ( 1) of this section shall be as follows:
(a) If such check, draft, or order or a series
of the same made or drawn in this state within a
period not exceeding six months amounts to a 0um
not more than $100, then a fine of not more than
$299 or imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than six months, or both.
(b) If such check, draft, or order or a seiies
of the same made or drawn in this state within a
period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum
exceeding $100 but not $2,500, then a fine of not
more than $5,000 or imprisonment in the state
prison for not more than five years, or both.
( c) If such check, draft, or order or a seiies
of the same made or drawn in this state within a
period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum
exceeding $2,500, then a fine of not more thar
$10,000.00 or imprisonment in the state prison, for
not more than ten years, or both."
The word "series" in the above citation is the major issue
of appellant's appeal.
Appelh:.nt has been convicted of writing seven bogtll
checks in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (1953).
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Appellant now argues that this statute must be interpreted to mean that any number of bad checks passed
within a six-month period, the total of which is between
$100.00 and $2,500.00, constitutes "a series" and a single
offense for purposes of imposing a penalty. Appellant
further argues that the statute requires that all bad
checks, issued within a six-month period, be prosecuted as
a single offense. Since appellant was charged with and
convicted of more than one offense arising out of the seven
checks issued during a six-month period he arguest that
he has been subjected to double jeopardy. This interpretation of the statute is unreasonable since in the instant
case appellant issued bad checks to three different businesses, on different dates, for different amounts, and in
exchange for different merchandise. Respondent contends
that appellant has committed three separate, distinct
offenses and has been properly charged and convicted for
all three.
Separate crimes are committed when one issues fraudulent checks on different occasions. This is made clear in
People v. Martin, 25 Cal. Rptr. 610, 208 Cal. App. 2d 867
(1962) and People v. Guastella, 44 Cal. Rptr. 678, 234
Cal. App. 2d 635 (1965). In the later case the defendant
had written six checks, each under $45.00. She was
charged with two felony counts and was given concurrent
sentences upon conviction. Another closely related case
is State v. Buckmaster, 94 Ariz. 314, 383 P. 2d 869 (1963).
This case held that separate crimes were committed when
the defendant paid for a truck with one bogus check and

ti

presented another check to the same person on the same
date, receiving money for the latter. Although the
utes in these other states are not identical to the Utah
statute, these cases show that separate crimes are corn.
when bad checks are issued on different occasions.

In his brief, appellant incorrectly states, "The Utah
datute defines a series as any number of checks issued
within a period of six months." Appellant contends that
all bad checks, over $100 and under $2,500, issued by one
individual in a six-month period is a single "series" and
constitutes only a single felony offense. This interpreta.
tion is unreasonable as it gives no recognition to different
victims cheated, different dates, different checks, or differ· ·
ent merchandise obtained with the bad checks. Appellant
urges this court to ignore the fact that each conviction in
the instant case resulted from completely separate acts
and each was based on different evidence.
Appellant's interpretation of the statute, which would
treat all bad checks between $100 and $2,500 as a single
felony would encourage crime. A defendant who had
already issued over $100 of bad checks would not be de·
terred from issuing additional checks up to $2,500 since
there would be no additional punishment after the first
$100 worth of bad checks had been issued. The California
cases cited in appellant's brief illustrate that additional
felonies are charged each time a defendant issues bad
checks in an amount over the statutory minimum for a
felony. In re Dich, 49 Cal. Rptr. 673, 411 P. 2d 56 (1966),
illustrates the California approach. After a defendant
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series of bad checks, enough checks are totaled
statutory dollar minimum is reached in order to
he felony charge. With the remaining checks the
)Cess is repeated. This results in additional felony
if the remaining checks again total the amount
y- to charge a felony. If the remaining checks do
the felony amount then additional misdemeanors

!

California and Utah statutes are not identical.
a Penal Code § 4 76a punishes a check or series
s under $100 ($50 before a recent amendment)
.demeanor and checks or a series of checks over
a felcny. This is much like the Utah statute to
tt. However, the Utah statute has an additional
and authorizes a more severe punishment for a
· series of checks over $2,500. Appellant argues
:rnse the Utah statute has the additional punishwisions for bad checks over $2,500 that a defennot be charged with several felonies falling in the
$2,500 category. This is unreasonable for it prodeterrent or punishment for issuing bad checks
,500, after a defendant has initially issued worthks of $100.

Jondent submits that the word "series" in the
iute does not require all bad checks between $100
)0 to be prosecuted as a single offense. This word
tatute simply allows several bad checks to be
11 order to charge a defendant with a felony rather
1isdemeanor. The word should not be construed
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to preclude prosecution of single checks or other series of
checks as either felonies or misdemeanors.
Appellant's interpretation of the statute leaves a legal
loophole for those who issue worthless checks. As pointed
out in the trial court's memorandum decisions (R. 42),
many problems could be encountered where a person is
charged with one insufficient funds check and then it is
later discovered that it is one of the great series written
over a six-month period. Appellant argues that if the defendant quickly pleads guilty to the one check, he would
be immune from prosecution of the other checks issued in
the same six month period. Respondent urges this Court
to reject the reasoning that would create such a loophole
in the law.

In his brief, appellant discusses at some length the
differences between the "same evidence" and "same transaction" tests as they relate to the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Respondent contends that
it is unnecessary in the instant case to deal with these
issues. Appellant could have been convicted under either
test since each of the appellant's convictions involved different "transactions" as well as different "evidence."
Appellant mistakenly relies on Ashe v. Swenson, 391
U. S. 436 (1970). In Ashe, supra, the defendant has
been tried and acquitted on the robbery of one of six victims in a group. The defendant was then retried and convicted of robbing another person in that group. The second prosecution was held to constitute double jeopardy.

9

The narrow issue m Ashe, supra, was whether the defendant had been one of the robbers. Id. at 445. In Ashe,
supra, the Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel would bar a conviction if that conviction rested
entirely upon a question of fact that had previously been
resolved in the defendant's favor. Our case is quite difforent. In the instant case, the issuance of seven checks
to three dHforent businesses, on three different occasions
constituted separate transactions and offenses. Unlike
Ashe, supra, appellant has not had a question of fact determined by a jury or court in a previous trial that is
dispositive of any issue touching the additional offenses.
In Wilkes v. United States, 438 F. 2d 125 (5th Cir. 1971),
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the Ashe
case and stated:
"That case did not involve the question whether
two different charges were so similar that they
constituted the same offense. . . . The Court did
not conduce that the defendant in that case could
not have been separately convicted of robbing each
of the victims if he had been the robber." Id. at
125.
When appellant was convicted in the Ogden City
Court of a misdemeanor charge based on the bad check
issued to Lafayette Electronics, he was not in jeopardy
of the felony charges based on other checks. Appellant
erroneously argues that this point was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387 (1970).

Waller, supra, concerned a very narrow question of
consecutive trials by city and State Governments for an
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offense arising out of identical acts. Waller, supra, merely
decided that, because of the identity of sovereigns, a st.ate
cannot prosecute a defendant for the same acts for which
he has already been previously tried in a municipal court.
In Waller, supra, the defendant removed a mural from
the city hall. He was apprehended and convicted for two
misdemeanors - the destruction of city property and
breach of the peace. Thereafter, based on the same theft,
the defendant was convicted in a state court of grand
larceny. The Supreme Court held that if both convictions
are based on the same act, the second trial constitutes
double jeopardy.
The instant case is easily distinguished from Waller,
supra. In Waller, both convictions were based on the same
act, i.e., stealing a mural from city hall. In the instant
case, appellant's convictions were based on completely
different acts. The writing of bad checks to different busi·
nesses on different dates cannot be considered the same
act.
POINT II.
THE RECORD AND EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-20-11(2)
(1953) DENIED APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OR SUBJECTED
APPELLANT TO PREJUDICIAL PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION.
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Appellant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (2)
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and is void because the penalty imposed for
its violation is not clear, specific and understandable.
In the case of Stephens v. Turner, 421 F. 2d 290 (10th
Cir. 1970) the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
the penalty provisions of the Utah statute in question
against charges that the provisions violated equal protection of the laws. The court stated:
"The unambiguous penalty provision of the
statute under consideration applies equally to all
persons and classes of persons in the State of Utah
without discrimination. Every person convicted of
violating the statute has an equal chance for lenience and it is not repugnant to the United States
Constitution." Id. at 292, 293.
In its opinion, the Tenth Circiut Court of Appeals
also stated that "equal protection of the laws within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
exact equality . . . Identical punishment for like crimes
is not required by the Fourteenth Amendment." [Cites
omitted.] Id. at 292.
Appellant relies on the case of State v. Shondel, 22
Utah 2d 343, 453 P. 2d 146 (1969), to show that the penalty provisions of the statute in question are void for uncertainty. In State v. Shondel, supra, this Court considered an uncertainty created by the overlapping of two
Utah statutes providing for punishment for the possession
of the drug LSD. The Narcotic Drug Act punished the
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possession of LSD as a felony and the Drug Abuse Con.
trol Law punished the same act as a misdemeanor. In that
case, this Court held that the lesser penalty prescribed for
the offense was applicable rather than the more severe
penalty.

1

The facts and principles of State v. Shondel, supra,
have little bearing on the facts of the instant case. State
v. Shondel, supra, concerned overlapping and contradict. 1
ing penalty provisions of two different statutes which pur.
ported to punish the same act. The instant case concerns ,
penalty provisions of the same statute which clearly defines the different degrees of punishment in relation w
differing dollar amounts of the bad checks involved.

State v. Shondel, supra, requires the penalty provi·
sions of a statute to be clear, specific and understandable.
Respondent submits that the penalty provisions of the
statute in question meet these requirements. If a defen·
dant issues a single check or a series of checks with a total •
dollar amount over $100 then a felony has been com·
mitted. If the total dollar amount of the single check or
the series of checks is under $100 then only a misdemeanor
can be charged. This formula is easily understood.
The record fails to show that appellant was subjected
to prejudicial prosecutorial discretion. Appellant pleaded .
guilty to a misdemeanor charge based on a bad check
issued on August 16, 1971 (R. 219). Two additional felony
charges were brought against him which were subsequently joined into a single felony charge with two counts.
Appellant was convicted of both counts of that felony
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charge and was given a single sentence.
Appellant seems to express the belief and hope that
this Court will adopt a rule prohibiting all but a single
prosecution when criminal conduct is continuous in nature. This belief and hope was rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Birch v. United States, 451 F.
2d 165 (10th Cir. 1971) and respondent urges this Court
to likewise reject this position. "Logic and fairness . . .
do not indicate that a premium benefit should be inherent
in a criminal spree." Id. at 167.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that appellant has not been subjected to double jeopardy. Appellant has committed three
separate, distinct offenses and has been charged and convicted of all three. Respondent respectfully submits that
the judgment of the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

